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Abstract: I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was 
a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world 
includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be 
adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is 
a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or 
persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind 
of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a 
certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by de-
fending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
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1. Introduction: Aims and Overview
In the present paper I defend two theses relevant to Descartes’s views on extended substances. In the first place, I will defend the view that he was a 
Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, I will contend that for Des-
cartes the extended world includes a plurality of bodies and, more specifically, 
that ordinary objects also count as substances for him. In the second place, and 
as part of my argument in favour of that thesis, I will defend a particular in-
terpretation of the notion of substance, one according to which this is a rather 
slim notion, making no requirements as regards individuation or specific per-
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sistence conditions, and imposing therefore no restrictions for the kinds of 
material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for 
a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by 
defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.
2. How many extended substances?
There seems to be no general agreement in the literature as to what 
would count as a corporeal substance for Descartes. One may get a good idea 
of the extent of the disagreement in this area by considering the widely differ-
ing answers that have been given to the question of just how many corporeal 
substances there are. One can distinguish in the relevant literature at least three 
different (groups of ) answers:
(i) In the first place, we find an answer that we could describe as Nihilist. 
This is a view according to which it would be incorrect to say there are any num-
ber of individual corporeal substances, but that, in this case, there is just corpo-
real stuff. This isn’t a particularly popular view, but one could think that people, 
such as Woolhouse (1993), that think that ‘corporeal substance’ is a mass term, 
endorse such a view. According to proponents of this view, the question ‘How 
many extended substances there are?’ is ill formed, as ‘extended substance’ isn’t a 
count term in the first place – so that, notice, the view implies that it is incorrect 
to say that there are individual corporeal substances not because the response to 
that question is that there are zero such substances, but because, more radically, 
the question makes no sense. For people that defend this kind of view, the so 
called ‘extended world’ is just an aggregate of corporeal stuff.1
(ii) On the other hand, one could also defend a Monist position, accord-
ing to which for Descartes there is just one corporeal substance, namely, the 
whole extended world. This appears to be or, in any case, to have been until re-
cently, the most popular view among Descartes scholars, having been defended 
1 Cf. Woolhouse (1993, 23): ‘[…] Descartes’s view that there are not many corporeal sub-
stances does not mean that there is only one, but that there is only corporeal substance as such’. 
In an earlier paper Woolhouse had already presented this Nihilist view, but was rather uncertain 
whether to prefer it to Monism: ‘[…] although there are many minds there are not many ex-
tended substances. What we might think of as separate corporeal substances – our own bodies 
and those of others, the trees and animals around us – are not so. They are merely parts of the 
extended corporeal substance that God created. Whether one should say that ‘extended sub-
stance’ is a count term (as is ‘thinking substance’) and that there is “one extended substance”, or 
whether one should say it is a mass term and that there is just “extended substance” is uncertain’ 
(1990, 23-4). See also Stuart (1999, 94-5) for an exposition and critical assessment of the view.
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by such influential commentators as, among others, Martial Gueroult (1953), 
Bernard Williams (1978) and John Cottingham (1986). Among more recent 
commentators, it has also been endorsed by Jorge Secada (2006).2
(iii) Finally, we find what we could describe as the Pluralist view, accord-
ing to which there are many (typically, indefinitely many) corporeal substanc-
es. I would like to distinguish two different varieties of this kind of view, as I 
will be endorsing one of them and rejecting the other. According to the variety 
I will eventually reject, (a) quantities of matter do, but ordinary objects do not, 
qualify as substances – this is a position that has been defended recently by 
authors such as Matthew Stuart (1999); according to an alternative position, 
on the other hand, (b) both quantities of matter and ordinary objects can be 
taken as substances – this is the position that I will endorse (and which is also 
accepted, for instance, by Peter Markie (1994), at least in relation to some of 
the notions of substance he distinguishes). Edward Slowik (2001) and Marleen 
Rozemond (2011) also defend pluralist views, but it is not clear to me to which 
of these varieties their views belong. 
3. The textual evidence
We have just presented three different views concerning how many cor-
poreal substances there are for Descartes. Now, what reasons can be given for 
adopting one of these views rather than the others? And, in particular, what 
evidence can we find in the Cartesian corpus as regards these issues? As one 
would probably expect, given how I have described the situation, the available 
evidence is far from clear, as there are different texts and considerations that 
2 This is, for instance, how Cottingham discusses Descartes’s notion of extended substance: 
‘There is a clear contrast here with the traditional Aristotelian conception of the world as com-
posed of a large number of individuals, each of which is regarded as a particular substance (for 
Aristotle, an individual horse or tree or chair qualifies as a substance). Instead Descartes offers 
a radically monistic view of corporeal substance. The physical universe is a single indefinitely 
extended thing: ‘The world, that is, the whole universe of created substance, has no limits to its 
extension’; ‘the matter whose nature consists simply in its being an extended substance occupies 
all imaginable space’ (Principles II, 21 and 22; AT VIII-A, 52)’ (1986, 84-5). It is interesting to 
note here that the passages that Cottingham quotes to substantiate his claim are relevant to the 
issue of the world’s being indefinitely extended, but not to its being the only one substance, for 
which claim he does not offer any textual evidence. Consider also how Williams puts forward 
a basically similar view: ‘Plurality genuinely occurs on the mental side at level I [of substances]; 
while on the material side, for Descartes, everyday references to a plurality of material substances 
really unmarket to level III [of modes], and are a way of speaking of what, more basically re-
garded, are modes of what, at level I, is just one extended substance, the whole physical universe 
(1978, 128)’. Cf. also Gueroult (1953, vol. 1, 103-18).
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speak in favour of each of these views. Any interpretation of Descartes’ views 
on extended substances, then, faces the challenge of giving a coherent reading 
of an heterogeneous series of texts, which, given the purpose of this paper, it 
will be convenient to divide into two different groups, according to whether 
they give prima facie evidence for, or against, the thesis that (some kinds of ) 
individual objects are substances.
3.1. Texts favouring Pluralism
Let us consider first a series of texts that seem to favour the view accord-
ing to which some individual objects are substances:
[1] Strictly speaking, a real distinction exists only between two or more sub-
stances; and we can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from 
the fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the oth-
er… […] For example, even though we may not yet know for certain that any 
extended or corporeal substance exists in reality, the mere fact that we have an 
idea of such a substance enables us to be certain that it is capable of existing. 
And we can also be certain that, if it exists, each and every part of it, as delim-
ited by us in our thought, is really distinct from the other parts of the same 
substance (Principles I 60, AT VIII-A, 28)3
[2] With regard to the clear and distinct elements in my ideas of corporeal things, 
it appears that I could have borrowed some of these from my idea of myself, 
namely, substance, duration, number and anything else of this kind. For example, 
I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of existing independently, 
and I also think that I am a substance (Third Meditation, AT VII, 44)
[3] […] perhaps some accidents, considered in themselves, may be substances, 
as clothing is an accident with respect to a human being (to Regius, AT III, 460)
[4] As for the difficulty you mention, concerning the Blessed Sacrament, I have 
no reply except that if God puts one purely corporeal substance in place of 
another, like a piece of gold in place of a piece of bread, or one piece of bread 
in place of another, he changes only the numerical unity of their matter by 
bringing it about that numerically the same matter, which was gold, takes on 
the accidents of the bread […] (to Clerselier, AT IV, 372)
3 Throughout the paper I follow the translations by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and 
Kenny in CSMK.
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[5] I am aware that certain substances are commonly called ‘incomplete’. But if 
the reason for calling them incomplete is that they are unable to exist on their 
own, then I confess I find it self-contradictory that they should be substances, 
that is, things which subsist on their own, and at the same time incomplete, that 
is, not possessing the power to subsist on their own. It is also possible to call a 
substance incomplete in the sense that, although it has nothing incomplete about 
it qua substance, it is incomplete in so far as it is referred to some other substance 
in conjunction with which it forms something which is a unity in its own right.
Thus a hand is an incomplete substance when it is referred to the whole body 
of which it is a part; but it is a complete substance when it is considered on 
its own. And in just the same way the mind and the body are incomplete sub-
stances when they are referred to a human being which together they make up. 
But if they are considered on their own, they are complete (Fourth Replies, AT 
VII, 222)
As we remarked above, these are just a few among many texts that seem to 
testify to Descartes’ belief in the substantiality of various particular individual 
bodies and, specifically, of some ordinary objects. Indeed, many recent authors 
(for instance, Slowik (2001) and Rozemond (2011)) have precisely drawn at-
tention to how many times Descartes talks of particular bodies as substances, 
and have expressed surprise on that account that the Monist interpretation had 
come to establish itself as the textbook view on the matter. We’ll consider later 
some other reasons for this interpretation below.4 But, in any case, there’s one 
important thing that should already be noted in relation to these texts, namely 
that, striking though that might be, all of the interpretations listed above, 
with the exception of one brand of Pluralism ((iii b), which is the view to be 
defended here), fail to accommodate texts [2] - [5] (and the many other similar 
ones scattered in the Cartesian corpus). Text [1] is a little bit different from the 
others, as it does not mention any ordinary object, but just parts of extension 
“delimited by us in our thought”, as individual substances; but, in any case, it 
4 John Heil has suggested to me, in conversation, that at least some of the remarks where 
Descartes talks of ordinary objects as substances may be just understood as ways of trying to 
make his meaning of ‘substance’ clear, by means of traditional examples, but that they should 
not be taken strictly as expressing his official views on the extension of ‘substance’ or of ‘ex-
tended substance’. A similar point has also been made by Stuart (1999, 100), when he says that 
‘Descartes must therefore be regarded as speaking lightly when he claims that stones, hands, 
and articles of clothing are substances’. I won’t claim that this possibility can be ruled out for all 
the texts just discussed; but I’d like to notice that this view seems highly implausible at least for 
some of these texts – for instance, for texts [1] and [5] above, whose contexts are precisely ones 
in which Descartes is trying to explain his technical notion of real distinction (a point similar to 
mine here has already been made by Rozemond 2011, 241). 
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is also clear that all Non-Pluralist interpretations (that is, the Monist and the 
Nihilist views) seem prima facie unable to accommodate this text and, there-
fore, the whole group of texts we have considered so far.
3.2. The Synopsis passage
What can Non-Pluralists offer by way of textual support for their view? 
It seems that the clearest textual evidence for such views, and perhaps the 
whole of such evidence, consists in one single text, text [6] below, taken from 
the Synopsis to the Meditations:
 
[6] First, we need to know that absolutely all substances, or things which must 
be created by God in order to exist, are by their nature incorruptible and cannot 
ever cease to exist unless they are reduced to nothingness by God’s denying his 
concurrence to them. Secondly, we need to recognize that body, taken in the gen-
eral sense, is a substance, so that it too never perishes. But the human body, in so 
far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration 
of limbs and other accidents of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made 
up of any accidents in this way, but is a pure substance. (…) And it follows from 
this that, while the body can very easily perish, the mind is immortal by its very 
nature (AT VII, 14, my emphasis).
Even though this text might prima facie give some support to the Monist and 
Nihilist readings of Descartes on material substance, the text is not as clear as 
one could hope, and some work must be done if it is to count in favour of any 
view – in particular, as we will see below, some work must be done to clarify 
the meaning of the phrases we have italicised in our quotation. But, in any 
case, the text certainly seems to lend some support to the denial of the status of 
substance to ordinary objects, suggesting, as it does, that human bodies are not 
substances. Nevertheless, it should also be borne in mind that in some other 
texts, such as [5] above, Descartes also explicitly affirms that human bodies are 
substances. So that, again, the evidence seems at best far from conclusive, and 
a careful study of their contexts and significance is called for.
Be that as it may, and even before going on to discuss some of them 
in some more detail, one striking fact regarding these texts should be noted, 
namely, that at least from a merely quantitative point of view, the textual evi-
dence seems to be overwhelmingly in favour of a Pluralist reading – and, in 
particular, in favour of one that counts ordinary objects as substances. But, 
before reaching any conclusive position on the issue, the weight and meaning 
of the Synopsis passage must be ascertained.
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4. How to interpret the SynopSiS passage
In any case, the Synopsis passage (text [6] above) has been something 
like a battlefield for the different positions concerning how many corporeal 
substances there are for Descartes, as it is supposed to be the main textual sup-
port for many of them. Of course, this is in part possible because the meaning 
of the text is not as clear as one might wish, which also accounts for the fact 
that people has to connect it to other Cartesian texts and/or well established 
theses when trying to figure out its meaning.
In connection with the issue we are discussing here, the diverse inter-
pretations of [6] mainly depend on different ways of understanding the clause 
italicised in our quote, namely, the phrase “… that body, taken in the general 
sense, is a substance” (corpus quidem in genere sumptum esse substantiam). In 
particular, there are two main points to be settled:
(a) How one should understand ‘body, taken in the general sense’ and
(b) How one should understand ‘a substance’ (or, better, the Latin term 
substantiam).
 
(a) What’s the meaning in this context of ‘body, taken in the general sense’? Let us 
notice first that, contrary to what will happen in relation to ‘substance’, it doesn’t 
really matter very much whether ‘body’ is taken here as a mass term or as a count 
noun; the Nihilist could take any stance here, for he can say that the ‘is’ in ‘is (a) 
substance’ is an ‘is’ of predication, not one of identity, so that, even if ‘substance’ 
is a mass term, ‘body’ could just as well be a mass term or a count noun (given 
that one could also characterize by means of a mass term something referred to 
using a count noun, as in ‘That patch of liquid over there is water’). For simplic-
ity’s sake, though, let us just assume that it is always a count noun. But now, what 
does it mean to take body ‘in the general sense’? Pluralists and Monists take two 
clear, contrasting sides on the issue: for the Pluralists, it seems, to take body in the 
general sense just consists in taking it as something that satisfies a general notion 
of body, one that may be used to characterize any (or, at least, many) different sec-
tions of extension: ‘body’ is here taken as a general term, that may be applied to a 
plurality of things in virtue of their having a bodily nature. For the Monists, on the 
other hand, Descartes adds to ‘body’ the phrase ‘taken in general’ to make it clear 
that it refers in that context to the sum of all sections of body, that is, they think 
that ‘body, taken in general’ designates in that context the whole extended world.5
5 This reading of ‘body, taken in general’ is explicitly adopted by Secada in the context of 
his endorsement of a Monistic view on corporeal substance. In effect, after stating that ‘there 
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(b) There are also some decisions that have to be made in relation to 
‘substance’, o ‘a substance’. The fact that in Latin there is no (definite or indefi-
nite) article makes the meaning of substantiam here somewhat indeterminate. 
In particular, we find that, while the Nihilists understand ‘substance’ (at least 
when applied to corporeal substances), as already noted, as a mass term, on the 
model of ‘water’, Monists and Pluralists alike understand it as a count noun, 
meaning, in that context, one substance. But there are really two different is-
sues behind this disagreement, clumsily expressed in these terms. On the one 
hand, the issue is presented as a grammatical point, as an issue of what kind of 
term ‘corporeal substance’ is; but there should really be no dispute at this level, 
given that both ‘substance’ and the composite phrase ‘corporeal substance’ are 
clearly used by Descartes as count nouns: not only is this reading assumed in 
the French translation of the Principles, which was revised by Descartes, where 
substantiam is in this passage translated as une substance (AT IX-B, 10); such 
phrases are also clearly used in that way in many other contexts, such as in the 
mention of ‘two or more substances’, even for the case of corporeal substances, 
in the definition of real distinction in Principles I 60 (text [1] above). But there 
is a further, deeper issue, which concerns not so much the logical or gram-
matical behaviour of ‘corporeal substance’, but the connection of the notion of 
(corporeal) substance with the notion of individuation. And, at this level, what 
has been presented as a disagreement between a “count term” or a “mass term” 
interpretation eventually reduces to the question of whether the conditions 
that something has to fulfil for it to count as a substance also involve criteria 
on how to individuate it, that is, on how the boundaries between different sub-
stances are to be drawn. So, for instance, if the notion of a substance is related 
to, say, a notion of form, or of functional unity among its parts, then if one 
describes something as a substance, one is committed to its being determined 
whether some particular section of extension is included in it or not, namely, 
either because it is connected or not functionally to it, or because it is informed 
or not by the same form. If one believes, then, that the notion of substance is 
related in this way to that of individuation, one has then a “count term” view 
on ‘substance’. On the contrary, if one does not think that there is such a con-
nection, one would have a “mass term” view. As we already said, though, that 
would be a misnomer, given that mass terms (or “mass notions”) are not the 
is strictly only one body which is “this world or the whole of corporeal substance” (AT VIII-A, 
52)’, and after quoting Descartes acknowledging that ‘this word ‘body’ is extremely equivocal 
(AT IV, 166)’, he says that, in that context, ‘“body” is “taken generally”, that is, to mean all 
the parts of the single corporeal substance’ (2006, 83). Chappell (2010, 258-9) also thinks this 
phrase has to be read so as to favour Monism. See also Rozemond (2011, 248-9) for discussion 
of this interpretation and a clear statement of the pluralist alternative reading sketched above.
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only terms that do not imply by themselves criteria of individuation: so called 
‘dummy sortals’, for instance, or adjectival notions, also fail to be so connected 
with criteria of individuation. The interesting issue, then, to which the discus-
sion concerning whether ‘corporeal substance’ is a mass term ultimately points, 
and which is highly relevant for our purposes here, is whether the notion of 
substance is rich enough so as to include criteria of individuation. In order to 
answer this question, we must turn now to an examination of the Cartesian 
notion of substance. 
5. Substance
5.1. Two notions of substance
It is usual, in the secondary literature on Descartes, to begin the discus-
sion of his views on substance by noticing that he gives two apparently dif-
ferent definitions of the notion, namely, on the one hand, (i) a definition of 
substance as an independent entity and, on the other hand, (ii) a definition of 
substance as an ultimate subject of attributes.6 Indeed, Descartes seems just to 
express here two strands of traditional thought about substance, which can be 
arguably traced back at least to Aristotle, namely, substance’s alleged capacity 
to exist apart, and substance’s being something that neither exists in, nor is 
said of, other things.7 Several Cartesian texts testify to the presence of these 
two strands in his thinking about substance. The conception of substance as 
an independent entity is present, for instance, in the following text, which 
constitutes the official definition of substance in the Principles:
[7] By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in 
such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence (Principles I, 51; AT 
VIII-A, 24)8
6 See, for instance, Kemp Smith (1953, 313-4) and Woolhouse (1993, 15). Other authors 
find in Descartes’ work, besides these, some further notions of substance. So, for instance, Mar-
kie (1994, 63) finds also a third, more restrictive notion of substance, that of pure substance, 
while Chappell (2010) distinguishes three different definitions (one in the Third Meditation and 
the Second Replies, a second one in the Fourth Replies and a still further one in the Principles) 
which, nonetheless, can be combined, in his view, to provide a unified account.
7 On the former character, cf., for instance, Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, Chapter 5, 1070b-
1071a; on the latter, Categories, Chapter 5, 2a 11 ff.
8 It has been noted that if ‘thing’ means (as sometimes with Descartes) the same as ‘sub-
stance’, the definition would be circular (and indeed, such a formulation, substituting ‘sub-
stance’ for ‘thing’, is used by Descartes in the Fourth Replies, AT VII, 226). I take it that, in that 
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But in many other texts we find another characterization of substance, accord-
ing to which it is described as a subject of, or as what supports, properties; as, 
for instance, in the following one, taken from the geometrically ordered Ap-
pendix to the Second Replies:
[8] Substance. This term applies to every thing in which whatever we perceive 
immediately resides, as in a subject, or to every thing by means of which what-
ever we perceive exists. By ‘whatever we perceive’ is meant any property, quality 
or attribute of which we have a real idea” (Second Set of Replies, AT VII, 161)
Before discussing any further these texts, and other relevant ones in the Car-
tesian corpus, let me pause briefly to say a few words regarding two possible 
strategies to explain away this apparent divergence: on the one hand, it would 
be implausible to explain the divergence as following from a development in 
Descartes’ thought, given that the two characterizations coexist in some of his 
works, even in the very same page: for instance, a description of substance as 
subject of properties appears in a discussion of our knowledge of substances 
in § 52 of Principles I, that is, in the paragraph immediately following the 
paragraph where text [7] appears. On the other hand, one could suggest that, 
while one of these notions may provide for Descartes a genuine definition of 
substance, the other would offer no more than an informal characterization of 
the things so defined; but it should be noticed, against this, that texts [7] and 
[8] are both offered (in their respective contexts) as definitions of substance.9
This situation requires us to try to figure out how these two notions of 
substance relate to one another. In the rest of this section, I elaborate first these 
two different characterizations of substance, and then proceed to the task of 
trying to assess what kind of relationship there is between them.
context, ‘thing’ must be understood as ‘entity’ (cf. Rosenkrantz and Hoffman 1991, 837; 
Markie 1994, 66).
9 Of course, one could still come up with rather more subtle narratives concerning the evolu-
tion of Descartes’ thought to defend the idea that both characterizations are not on a par; for 
instance, one could suggest that, while he defines substance as a subject in 1641, he changes his 
mind, rejects that definition, and defines it as an independent entity in 1644, retaining the for-
mer definition now as a non-defining characterization. This would be a very subtle change, but 
in any case one that does not affect the main point that Descartes believed for some time that 
substances satisfied both characterizations, no matter how he conceived the question of priority, 
so that we still face the problem of understanding how the two notions relate to one another.
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5.2. Substance as an independent entity
Text [7], then, is the standard formulation of the concept of substance as 
an independent entity. But it remains to be clarified, in particular, what kinds 
of independence (and, correspondingly, of dependence) are at stake in this 
formulation. The kinds of dependence usually discussed in connection to Des-
cartes’ notion of substance as an independent entity are mainly those of causal 
and inherential dependence; but mereological dependence (the dependence of 
something on its proper parts) and essential dependence (that is, the depen-
dence of a substance on its attributes, or on its essential properties in general) 
are also sometimes mentioned in this connection. Let us consider the evidence 
for supposing that any of these notions is present in Descartes discussions of 
independence.
It seems plausible, in the first place, to suppose that the dependence at 
stake in the definition of substance is at least to some extent of a causal kind. 
In effect, after introducing the notion of substance in [7], Descartes goes on 
to say the following:
[9] And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on 
no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we 
perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s concurrence (Principles 
I, 51; AT VIII-A, 24)
Since all other things except God are said to fail the stated definition because 
they are not completely independent in the relevant sense, and since this fail-
ure is brought about by those other things being causally dependent on God 
(God’s concurrence being plausibly understood as a kind of causal relation), 
then it seems plausible to suppose that the relevant sense of independence 
must be, at least to some extent, causal independence. But this admission, even 
if it is correct, does not settle conclusively the issue: on the one hand, it might 
be the case that the relevant notion of dependence is a broader one, including, 
but not being exhausted by, causal dependence.10 Indeed, as will become clear 
later, I think this is actually the case. On the other hand, not every kind of 
causal relation may be intended by Descartes to be relevant in this connection; 
in particular, there is a distinction among two different kinds of effects that 
seems significant here, namely, one that Descartes makes in the Fitfth Replies 
10 This point has been very well argued for by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008, 84-5) against Stuart 
(1999, 88 ff.), who had defended the idea that the notion of dependence involved in the defini-
tion of substance as an independent entity is (mainly) a causal one.
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between something’s being a cause of the coming into being of something else, 
on the one hand, and something’s being a cause of the being of something else 
(or of its remaining in existence), on the other.
[10] When you deny that in order to be kept in existence we need the continual 
action of the original cause, you are disputing something which all metaphysi-
cians affirm as a manifest truth – although the uneducated often fail to think 
of it because they pay attention only to the causes of coming into being and not 
the causes of being itself. Thus an architect is the cause of a house and a father of 
his child only in the sense of being the causes of their coming into being; and 
hence, once the work is completed it can remain in existence quite apart from 
the ‘cause’ in this sense. But the sun is the cause of the light which it emits, and 
God is the cause of created things, not just in the sense that they are causes of 
the coming into being of these things, but also in the sense that they are causes 
of their being; and hence they must always continue to act on the effect in the 
same way in order to keep it in existence (Fifth Set of Replies; AT VII, 369)11
Taking into account the examples discussed, it seems that it is only the causal 
dependence on God of something’s being that is clearly involved in the defini-
tion of substance in the § 51 of Principles (text [7] above). Besides, it should 
also be noticed that, as the examples in text [10] suggest, if the relevant notion 
of dependence included also the causal dependence connecting a cause with 
something’s coming into being, then one should conclude that most ordinary 
objects would not count as substances. The fact that there are plenty of texts 
in which Descartes describes such objects as substances would count against 
taking this kind of causal relation as included in the relevant notion of depen-
dence (unless there are stronger reasons to the contrary). The relevant notion 
of dependence seems to be, then, the one that takes place between something 
and what sustains it in existence.
What about inherential dependence? Taking into account different re-
marks on the notion of substance by Descartes, some of which we have already 
quoted, it does seem to be an important part of what it means to be a substance 
that, in contrast to some created entities (namely, modes) that do depend for 
their existence on inhering in some other things (namely, substances), sub-
stances do not depend on other things in just this way. This is most clearly 
expressed in an addition to the French version of Principles I, 51:
11 A similar contrast between the relation of a builder to the house he builds, on the one 
hand, and of God to myself as his creature, on the other, is discussed again in the Conversation 
with Burman (AT V, 156).
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[11] In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they cannot 
exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary concurrence of 
God in order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the latter ‘substances’ 
and the former ‘qualities’ or ‘attributes’ of those substances (AT IX-B, 47)
It is clear that the relation implicit here is that of inherence, which is certainly 
a relation different from that of concurrence also mentioned in this context 
(which, as we saw, is a kind of causal dependence). But what I would like 
to stress now is rather that, notwithstanding the many differences that one 
could certainly find between these two relations, they also seem to have much 
in common when one takes them as kinds of dependence: in particular, it 
seems that we have in both cases a relation in which something supports, or 
sustains, something else in existence. This becomes also apparent in Descartes’ 
description, in text [8] above, of the kind of dependence properties have on 
substances: remember that he says there, not only that a substance is that ‘in 
which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject’, which would 
refer to a “pure” notion of inherence, so to speak, but also that a substance is 
that ‘by means of which whatever we perceive exists’ (my emphasis). This phrase 
suggests, in my view, that a sort of active, causal-like relation of sustaining or 
of maintaining in existence is integral to Descartes’ view of inherence, so that 
the notions of concurrence and inherence are not really so far away from one 
another as they are usually taken to be. Of course, I do not intend to deny the 
important differences there are between causal and inherential sorts of depen-
dence, to which we will turn our attention presently. But it might still be the 
case, and I’d like to suggest it is actually the case, that there is a common core 
to both relations, and that this core is precisely the sort of dependence relation 
that is relevant to the definition of substance – and, indeed, that this relation is 
the one that articulates all of Descartes’ ontological categories.
Let us pause now to consider the differences between the two kinds of 
dependence we have focused on so far. Consider the example of the sun and 
the light in text [10]. I take it that the main difference between the relation 
between the sun and the light, on the one hand, and the relation between, say, 
the sun and its shape, on the other, is that whereas the shape is a necessary 
constituent of the sun, in the sense that it depends at least generically on its 
having one shape or another, the case is different concerning the light, whose 
production does not seem to be required for something to count as the sun.12 
12 Of course, I am commiting myself to the validity of this point only as regards an usual, 
intuitive appraisal of the sun’s relation to its shape, on the one hand, and the light it emits, on 
the other. Whether this appraisal is actually correct is controversial, and depends, among other 
things, on how one understands the relation between properties and causal powers or laws of 
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But, even if these are important differences, there are good grounds for sup-
posing that, quite apart from that, what is at stake in both cases is a relation 
of sustaining, or of being a support, or a ground, for something’s existence, 
that seems to me to be the notion of dependence behind the definition of 
substance as an independent entity. There are two main grounds to accept, it 
seems to me, besides the textual support already offered, such a view. On the 
one hand, it helps understand Descartes’ attitude to his different definitions of 
substance: he never seems to have thought that those different definitions, as 
represented by the apparently dissimilar ones presented in texts [7] and [8], are 
in conflict with one another; but, in that case, he must think that the notions 
of dependence and inherence that appear in them are not as radically diverse as 
has sometimes been thought (I’ll return to this below). On the other hand, it 
may explain his complete neglect, in the context of the characterization of sub-
stances, of other dependence relations that have been sometimes mentioned in 
the literature, and that have been the focus of recent work on grounding and 
dependence – mainly, the dependence of a substance on its proper parts, and 
on its essence. The discussion of these two further kinds of dependence will 
complete our discussion of substance as an independent entity.
Let us begin by considering the relation between a substance and its es-
sence or, in Cartesian terms, its principal attribute. It is sometimes assumed 
that this relation is problematic in the context of a definition of substance as an 
independent entity because, when discussing the distinction of reason (Prin-
ciples I, § 62), Descartes affirms that it is impossible for a substance to exist 
(and to be conceived of ) without its attributes, and that it is impossible for its 
attributes to exist (and to be conceived of ) without the substance; and this is 
supposed to imply that there is some kind of mutual dependence between sub-
stances and their (principal) attributes. Now, if were is true that substances de-
pend on their attributes, that would conflict with Descartes’ clearly stated view 
that created substances depend only on God for their existence. Some authors 
have tried to solve this conflict by arguing that, for Descartes, substances and 
their (principal) attributes are indeed identical (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2008). 
This seems to me an unsatisfactory solution, for reasons I cannot discuss fully 
here – it implies, for instance, that all attributes are identical to one another.13 
But the discussion on dependence above seems to provide a much more prom-
ising solution of this puzzle: if we suppose that the notion of dependence 
nature, on the one hand, and also the relation between the conceivable and the possible, on the 
other. Given that the example is only taken an illustration, I think I can avoid entering into 
these topics here.
13 I discuss this more comprehensively in “Descartes on Attributes” (unpublished).
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relevant to the definition of substance is the richer, more specific, and asym-
metrical one of sustaining something in existence, then we could say that the 
dependence allegedly involved in the distinction of reason does not affect the 
fact that a substance depends only on God, because there are two different 
notions of dependence involved in the (apparent) conflict: on the one hand, 
the stronger one of sustaining in existence, which is the only one relevant for 
the characterization of substances and regarding which it is true to say that 
substances depend only on God; on the other hand, a purely modal notion of 
dependence understood in terms of necessary coexistence which, even though 
in fact relates substances and attributes, is irrelevant for the characterization of 
something as a substance.
The relation between a substance and its parts is somewhat different. 
Note in the first place that it does not seem to have a single modal profile in 
the different cases, so that the relation could not be captured in simple modal 
terms: while Descartes thinks that in some cases, that of the so called “bodies 
in general”, particular sections of matter do have their parts essentially, in some 
other cases, for instance, that of human bodies, this is not so (see text [15] be-
low). In any case, if our hypothesis is correct that the only notion of dependence 
that is relevant for the definition of substance is that of sustaining something 
in existence, then that would explain Descartes’ clear neglect of the relation 
between a substance and its parts in this context. Certainly, it seems implausible 
to suppose that the parts support or sustain in existence the substances they 
conform in a sense remotely akin to that in which that substance is sustained in 
existence by God. Indeed, Descartes clearly implies that wholes and parts are on 
a par from an ontological point of view: whole human bodies and human hands 
are both characterized by him as substances (see text [5] above).
5.3. Substance as subject of properties
In other texts, such as [7] above, we find a rather different notion of 
substance: that of substance as a subject of properties, that is, as one thing ‘in 
which whatever we perceive immediately resides’. In a sense, as Markie had 
remarked, this notion of substance is ‘almost the flip-side of the concept of 
substance [as an independent entity]’, focusing, as it does, not on the indepen-
dence of substances as regards other entities – and, in particular, in this case, 
as regards modes – but, on the contrary, on the dependence other things have 
on substances. As Markie says: ‘Being a substance [in the sense of a subject] 
consists, not in being independent of other things, but in being something of 
which other things are not independent, something on which they depend as 
a subject for their existence’ (1994, 75). Given that the relation focused on in 
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this characterization of substance is just the counterpart of the independence 
of substances as regards modes (and, indeed, as regards properties in general), 
and that the asymmetric relation made up from these two aspects exhausts the 
connection between substances and modes, it is not surprising that the notion 
of substance as subject has been found to be coextensive with the notion of 
substance as an independent entity when restricted to created substances – 
that is, to things that depend only on God for their existence (Markie 1994, 
78). Nonetheless, even if this is so it is important to notice that it is not prima 
facie obvious that whatever falls within one of these concepts also falls within 
the other: that is, it is not implied by the idea that something is independent 
of some things that there are some further things which depend on it: it just 
turns out, in the ontological scheme recognized by Descartes, that what is only 
dependent on God is such that all the other things there are (that is, properties 
in general, which are identified directly on the basis of our experience) depend 
on them. And this dependence, as we suggested above, is plausibly understood 
as a particular variety of the relation of being sustained in existence. On the 
other hand, finally, further details which would have to be settled if we are to 
have a definite image of substances so characterized, such as whether we should 
understand the subject of properties as a substratum, or as the whole concrete 
particular (a kind of ambiguity that besets subject theories of substance since 
Aristotle), may be safely left aside here: the different answers to such questions 
are orthogonal to the problem we are dealing with in the present paper, so that 
a discussion of them would be beside the point here.
5.4. A unified notion of substance?
What we have said so far concerning these two characterizations of sub-
stance suggests, in my view, that they are arguably much more closely connect-
ed than has been usually assumed. I have suggested, indeed, on the one hand, 
that the notion of dependence focused on in the characterization of substance 
as an independent entity is the rather specific one of supporting or sustaining 
something else’s existence; and, on the other hand, I have also suggested that 
the relation of inherence relating modes and substances is nothing more than 
one specific form that this relation of dependence may take. Now, if this sug-
gestion is right, then this notion of sustaining in existence is the one central 
notion behind the different characterizations of substance in the Cartesian 
texts: and it is also arguably the notion that articulates the different ontological 
categories, by locating created substances in the middle position in the onto-
logical hierarchy, below God, on the one hand, because they are always being 
sustained by Him in existence, and above modes (and properties in general), 
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on the other hand, because substances are required to sustain modes in exis-
tence (and, on the other hand, they are not sustained by modes).14 These last 
two aspects of the asymmetrical relation of inherence, then, are (part of ) what 
gets described in the two different characterizations of substance: the inde-
pendence of substances from modes in the independence conception, and the 
corresponding dependence of modes on substances in the subject conception. 
This leaves us with a fairly unified notion of substance, articulated in terms 
of relations of dependence: a substance is something sustained in its existence 
only by God (and, therefore, not sustained in existence by any other created 
thing); and, besides, a substance is something which sustains the properties we 
perceive. Having clarified in this way the Cartesian notion of substance, we 
must examine next its connection to the problems about material substances 
we were considering.
6. Corporeal substances
What consequences can be drawn from our discussion of substance for 
the issues regarding corporeal substances we were discussing? In my view, the 
main point to take into account is that the notion of substance is a rather thin 
one, one that imposes very few constraints on whatever is to be characterized 
as such: it just allows us to admit as a substance any entity playing a certain 
functional role but, beyond the requirement of fulfilling that role, it doesn’t 
characterize such entities any further. As Markie had remarked, in relation 
both to the notion of substance as an independent entity, and as a subject of 
properties, the notion of substance does not really have much metaphysical 
content. This is what he has to say in connection with Descartes’ contention 
that he is a substance:
[12] His claim to be such a substance is consistent with his being material and 
with his being immaterial. It is consistent with his being a bare substratum-
qualities combination, with his being a bundle of qualities, and with his being 
neither. It is consistent with his being divisible into other substances [here, as 
independent entities] and with his not being so divisible… (1994, 73)
14 We may note, in passing, that the fact that Descartes seems to presuppose in his Third 
Meditation proofs of the existence of God (AT VII, 40) a single ontological hierarchy articulated 
by some notion of dependence seems to favour the view that there must be a central core behind 
the different notions of dependence involved (otherwise, what we get as a result would not be a 
single, unified, hierarchy).
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So, no matter how an entity might be further characterized, it is enough for 
it to count as a substance that it occupies the role of what sustains, or is the 
ground of, the properties it has, and that it is something not grounded on, 
that is, independent of, anything but God. But then, if this is right, it seems to 
corroborate what the many Cartesian texts quoted above already strongly sug-
gested, namely, that there is no reason to deny substance status to individual 
bodies – and, in particular, to deny such status to ordinary objects. Indeed, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that such bodies are for Descartes things that are 
sustained in existence only by God, and are also things that sustain, although 
are not sustained by, their properties. Indeed, what is important to notice in 
this context is that it doesn’t seem possible to extract, from the requirements 
for being a substance, any criterion for drawing boundaries between substanc-
es; that is, no specific principle of individuation follows from them.
Moreover, our discussion of substance provides us with a powerful tool 
to reject the two main arguments for denying substance status to ordinary 
objects that one can find in the literature. The first of these, sometimes called 
“The Spinozistic Argument” (Rozemond 2011), and which is one of the main 
arguments that have been adduced in favour of a Monistic reading of Des-
cartes, may be found in the following passage by Spinoza: 
[13] For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really 
distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining con-
nected with one another as before? And why must they all be so fitted together 
that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really distinct from one 
another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other. Since, 
therefore, there is no vacuum in Nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere), but all 
its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows also that they cannot 
be really distinguished, i.e., that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, 
cannot be divided (Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Scholium to Prop. 15; G II, 59)
The argument seems to be as follows:
(1) Substances are things that exist independently of any other thing 
(unless, in the case of creatures, they depend on God) (Premiss)
(2) A vacuum is impossible (Premiss).
(3) Any finite section of extension cannot exist unless the whole indefi-
nitely extended corporeal world exists (from 2).
(4) Any finite section of extension depends on other corporeal things 
(from 3, meaning of ‘depend’).
(5) Any finite section of extension is not a substance (from 1, 4).
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It seems clear enough that Premises (1) and (2) are accepted by Descartes: (1) 
is what he actually gives as his definition of substance in Principles I, § 51 (text 
[7]), and he endorses (2) in Principles II, § 16. So, could one resist this argu-
ment? And how?
The obvious candidates for rejection are the transition from (2) to (3) 
(‘(2) to (3)’ in what follows), and the transition from (3) to (4) (‘(3) to (4)’). 
(2) to (3) might perhaps be resisted, but its rejection would involve us in con-
troversial and difficult issues, such as that of the modal status of some theses in 
Descartes’ physics. Taking into account our previous discussion of the notion 
of substance, I propose to concentrate efforts on (3) to (4) instead. I think that 
one could appeal to some features of the notion of dependence relevant for 
Descartes’ definition of substance to invalidate this transition. 
First of all, we should notice that Descartes uses in his characterization of 
the ontological categories relations of dependence that only relate individuals 
(even when the notion of dependence is understood in purely modal terms). 
This is clear in the case of substances and modes: when it is said that a sub-
stance is independent of a mode that inheres in it, what is meant is just that 
that particular substance is independent of that particular mode (and, on the 
other hand, when it is said that the mode depends on the substance, what is 
meant is that that particular mode depends on that particular substance). This 
is connected to the fact that a substance is not generically independent from 
modes, because substances depend for their existence, in this modal sense, on 
their having some modes or others (for instance, a body requires for its exis-
tence some shape or other); so that, when it is said that substances are indepen-
dent of modes, the only thing that can be meant is that they are independent 
of individual modes. Similarly, in the vacuum case, one could say that a certain 
particular body requires some body or other to fill the unlimited extension 
around it, but this does not mean that it requires that a certain particular body, 
that actually happens to fill it, does so. The requirement, or the dependence 
here, is only generic: a body requires for its existence that some body or other 
fills the indefinitely extended space around it, but its existence does not require 
the presence of any particular body. If this is correct, then (4), at least in the 
sense in which it must be understood in order to be able to justify in its turn 
(5), does not follow from (3), because, while (3) states a purely generic require-
ment for the existence of a section of body, (4) expresses a stronger require-
ment, that of the existence of particular individuals.15
15 A similar strategy, inspired in comments by Leibniz intended for de Volder (in a draft of 
June 23, 1699) is defended (slightly differently) by Rozemond (2011, 255). 
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This line of defence against the Spinozistic Argument is available even 
for someone who takes the relevant notion of dependence in simple modal-
cum-existential terms, as necessary coexistence. But, as we saw, the notion of 
dependence involved in the characterization of substance seems to be a richer 
one, the notion of being sustained in existence. A particular body, then, if one 
takes this richer notion, would fail to count as a substance only if it depends 
in this way on something other than God. But do Spinoza’s considerations 
imply that bodies depend on some other bodies in this way? It seems clear to 
me that bodies do not stand to other bodies in this kind of dependence, that 
is, that a body is not sustained, or kept in existence, by other bodies, even 
if it is correct to suppose that it cannot possibly exist without those other 
bodies (or, generically, some bodies or other). The picture that emerges from 
these considerations is then one in which each individual body depends in a 
particularized way, so to speak, on God, and on God alone, in the sense that 
each body is sustained in existence by a specific act of God. This particularized 
character of the dependence, on the other hand, seems to be what is at stake 
in Descartes’ countenancing the possibility of God’s annihilating one piece of 
matter (through denying his concurrence) while preserving another (cf. Prin-
ciples II, §18, AT VIII-A, 50).16 
Recent work by Marleen Rozemond (2011) on the notion of real dis-
tinction is in agreement with this hypothesis, so that her independent results 
help to establish its plausibility. Although she focuses more on the notion of 
real distinction, and not so much on that of substance, the connection be-
tween the two notions is tight enough for theses on one of them to be rel-
evant for the other. What Rozemond defends in that paper, drawing from a 
discussion of the notions of distinction and separability in Suárez, is that the 
separability required for two items to be really distinct of one another may be 
weaker than separability in the sense of one thing being able to exist without 
the other thing existing, so that two things may still be really distinct through 
not depending on one another in some suitable, stronger sense, even though it 
is impossible for one thing to exist without the other existing (as in the case of 
(substantial) creatures and God: they are really distinct, even though a creature 
cannot exist without God existing). I take it that Rozemond’s results, based 
16 Of course, given God’s simplicity, it would be strictly wrong to speak of “specific acts” of 
God, if this is taken to imply that they are different acts, just as it would be strictly wrong to talk 
about his different attributes (cf. Principles I, § 23, AT VIII-A, 14: ‘And even his understanding 
and willing does not happen, as in our case, by means of operations that are in a certain sense 
distinct from one another; we must rather suppose that there is always a single identical and 
perfectly simple act by means of which he simultaneously understands, wills and accomplishes 
everything’). All differences in God are thus ascribed to him as a result of our considering his 
effects from our perspective. 
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mainly on contextual evidence about a distinct but related notion, lends more 
plausibility to our own account.
The Spinozistic Argument alludes to a certain (alleged) structural de-
pendence between particular pieces of body and all other pieces of body. A 
further argument sometimes used against Pluralism, and in particular against 
the thesis that ordinary objects count as substances for Descartes, arises from 
taking into account, as relevant for the definition of substance, the causal de-
pendence between the existence of some such objects and some other bodies. 
Matthew Stuart thinks this favours his own pluralist take on corporeal sub-
stances, according to which quantities of matter, but not ordinary objects, are 
substances. This is why, according to him, ordinary objects should not be seen 
as substances:
[14] Do human bodies, tables, and planets count as secondary substances on 
the causal reading of the independence criterion? It would seem that they do 
not. For even if each of them is causally dependent on God for its preservation, 
none is causally dependent on God alone at every moment of its existence. Hu-
man bodies are brought into existence by the sexual activities of human beings; 
tables are brought into existence by the labor of woodworkers; and, according 
to Cartesian physics, planets are brought into existence by huge, spinning vor-
tices of celestial matter. Furthermore, there are occasions on which not only 
the creation but also the continued existence of a physical object depends on 
the activity of a created thing. For example, the continued existence of a fragile 
glass vase might depend on the exertions of a person who keeps a weight from 
crushing it. This result accords with Descartes’s denial, in the Synopsis passage, 
that the human body is a substance (1999, 90)
One main problem with this view lies in its causal reading of dependence: even 
though there is, as we have seen, a causal strand to the notion of dependence 
relevant for a characterization of substance, it is of a quite specific nature, 
and one that also overlaps to a certain extent with the converse of inherence, 
namely, the relation of sustaining something in existence. But, as we saw in con-
nection with text [10] and its distinction between the cause of the coming into 
being of something and the cause of its mere being, only the latter is relevant 
in this context; and, on the other hand, it is clear that the examples of causal 
dependence discussed in text [14] are cases of causes of the coming into being 
of ordinary objects (or the correlative relation of ceasing to be; the efforts to 
guarantee the continued existence of the vase are nothing more than intermit-
tent attempts at preventing its destruction). But, if this is correct, it is clear that 
this specific causal dependence does not prevent ordinary finite objects from 
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being substances, given that they are things that are still sustained in existence 
only by God, and depend in that specific way on no other thing – whereas 
some properties do depend on (each of ) them. 
Our proposal concerning corporeal substances could then be summa-
rized as follows: any piece of matter (or extension) is at every moment of its 
existence a substance because, at every moment of its existence, it is (or it is 
constituted by) something, namely, a fragment of extension, that depends on 
God’s concurrence, and on God’s concurrence alone, to remain in existence, 
while it also sustains in existence, in the appropriate sense, some other, more 
dependent beings, such as modes and attributes.17 In particular, every ordinary 
corporeal object (such as a chair or a human hand) would count as a substance, 
because at every moment it coincides with such a piece of matter or extension. 
It is important to notice, in this regard, that no more specific condition of 
individuation or persistence is involved in the notion of a substance as we have 
construed it, besides the already noticed fact that a substance would cease to 
exist if God stopped sustaining it through his concurrence. This means that the 
requirements for being a substance are not strict enough so as to imply that 
only some particular kinds of material objects may count as substances, while 
others may not. 
The conception sketched above sounds very much like Stuart’s own 
view that only pieces of matter, in Helen Cartwright’s sense, are substances 
(cf. Cartwright 1970). It would seem then worthwhile to try to state more 
precisely the difference between his view and the one defended here. He bases 
his view mainly on the Synopsis passage (text [6] above), and an identifica-
tion of ‘body, taken in the general sense’ with quantities of matter, on the 
basis of the following remarks by Descartes, in the context of a discussion of 
transubstantiation:
[15] First of all, I consider what exactly is the body of a man, and I find that this 
word ‘body’ is very ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, we mean 
17 The form ‘it is (or it is constituted by)’ in the main text above is a deliberate hedge, by 
which I imply that I need not take a stand on whether for Descartes constitution is or is not 
the same as identity – the view defended here is compatible with any of the alternatives, and 
requires only a change in formulation from one version to the other. On the other hand, I as-
sume that attributes are not identical to the substances of which they are attributes, as many 
recent commentators have supposed, but that they conform, together with modes, a wider class 
of properties (a class Descartes never mentions as such, although he sometimes refers to it as the 
class of ‘modes or attributes’). I cannot try to substantiate this view here, although I try to do so 
elsewhere (“Descartes on Attributes”, unpublished).
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a determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is 
composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were removed, 
we would judge without more ado that the body was smaller and no longer 
complete; and if any particle of the matter were changed, we would at once 
think that the body was no longer quite the same, no longer numerically the 
same. But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate 
part of matter, or one that has a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of 
the matter which is united with the soul of that man. And so, even though that 
matter changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is 
the same body, numerically the same (to Mesland, 9.2.45; AT IV, 166)
I think that this text indeed induces an identification between ‘body, taken 
in general’ and ‘quantities of matter’, if we take this as equivalent to ‘pieces of 
extension’. But, even though Descartes goes on, after introducing this notion, 
to discuss persistence conditions for quantities of matter, and to contrast these 
with persistence conditions for ordinary objects, this contrast has no implica-
tion as regards the substantial character of ordinary objects, because no specific 
persistence conditions are relevant for characterizing something as a substance: 
the text does not imply anything more than that an ordinary object coincides, 
in each successive stage, with (possibly different) quantities of matter. But the 
fact that it coincides with a quantity of matter at each stage of its existence is 
precisely that in virtue of which it is appropriate to say of it, at every stage, that 
it is a substance: this is unaffected by the fact that, considered as a quantity of 
matter, it has different persistence conditions than it has when considered, say, 
as a human body.
7. Conclusion
If what I have suggested so far is plausible, the following image of Des-
cartes’ view on corporeal substances emerges: any section of matter at any 
moment counts as a substance, because any section of matter fulfils at that mo-
ment the rather slim requirements for being a substance, namely: it is some-
thing that sustains its own properties and is itself something only sustained in 
existence by God. Besides, ordinary objects can also count, according to this 
view, as substances, given that at any given moment an ordinary object coin-
cides with a section of matter, that is, is something that sustains properties and 
is sustained in existence only by God. In this sense, it is important to notice 
that ascribing ‘being a substance’ to something has no implication as regards 
any specific persistence conditions – for instance, as regards the condition s 
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unde r which something becomes, or ceases to be, say, a human body, or a chair 
(remember that such changes have no relation with the kind of dependence 
relevant for the definition of substance). When a particular chair, then, or a 
human body, is considered to be a substance, it is not a substance qua chair, 
or qua human body, but only in so far as, at every stage of its career, it is, or it 
is constituted by, something, a piece of matter, that fulfils the functional roles 
just described.18
18 I would like to thank audiences in Buenos Aires, Mar del Plata, Santiago de Chile and 
Temuco for questions and comments, in particular José Tomás Alvarado, Paula Castelli, Robert 
García, John Heil, Samuel Herrera, Felipe Johnson, Santiago Orrego and Jeff Snapper. Special 
thanks go to Mario Caimi and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, who provided written comments on 
an earlier version of this paper.
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